Introduction
The people of this country are generally faithless, without truth and honesty; exceeding subtle, covetous without mean or measure, never ceasing to beg and crave most basely, and impudently admitting to trade with us for fear and not for love; not to be gained by good usage nor any benefits; but their turns being once served the remembrance of it is straight forgotten. 1 I find the Mughals to be a nation whose word cannot be trusted, being highly experienced in the doctrine of Machiavelli. It is rare enough that they act in accordance with the king's edict or farman, and without the king's farman it is impossible to trade here, since the governors change annually and only seek to fill their pockets. 3 A textbook example of such an institutional innovation is the joint-stock company. While
North's thesis provides a ready explanation of the flourishing of the East India Companies in terms of reduced transaction costs, its articulation of the problem of trust remains limited to principal-agent relations. 4 Likewise, the work of Avner Greif did much to clarify the monitoring of agency relations within social or ethnic groups, yet tells us comparatively little about how trust functioned across cultural borders. 5 If anything, the literature seems to suggest that cross-cultural trade was almost universally perceived as involving greater risks than trade relations based on kinship or ethnicity. 6 As the East India
Companies dealt almost exclusively with people who not only belonged to other political and legal entities but were also ethnically and religiously different, a fuller understanding of the implications of perceived otherness for such encounters is needed.
This chapter focuses on ethnographic discourse as a means to explore the mentalities of commercial agents. It suggests that cultural assumptions, prejudice, and anxieties about outsiders were just as important in shaping VOC and EIC approaches to overseas trade as was economic rationality. Clad in hyperbole, Pepwell's characterisation of Gujarat's inhabitants outlines the three most potent stereotypes about Indian traders and government officials contained in seventeenth-century Company writing; namely that they were deceitful, avaricious, and more susceptible to force than to peaceful means. Given that such claims were interwoven into first-hand accounts, the extent to which they rested on received notions is often concealed. Van Ravesteyn's assertion exemplifies this point.
Ostensibly based on personal observation, his sociological explanation of the moral qualities of Mughal government -their lack of job-security induced office-holders to neglect the common good -in fact drew on the trope of Oriental despotism, in particular the notion that the emperor could arbitrarily dispose of all lands, goods, and persons. 7 In addition, the generic reference to Machiavellianism served to reinforce his depiction of the Mughals as crafty, unscrupulous, and greedy. To dismiss such prose as merely rhetorical would be to overlook the profound influence of cultural discourse on the commercial strategies of the EIC and VOC.
The Dutch and English presence in seventeenth-century Mughal India was characterised by three overlapping approaches to cross-cultural trade. In line with policies pursued throughout maritime Asia, the East India Companies primarily endeavoured to obtain trading concessions from Indian authorities through a mixture of political negotiation and gunboat diplomacy. Mughal officials based on mutual benefit gradually emerged as the preferred mode of cross-cultural interaction for many agents on the ground.
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As this chapter seeks to demonstrate, ethnographic assumptions about Indian people and cultural notions of trust played a defining role in shaping each of these three lines of action. Before taking up the analysis of Dutch and English approaches to cross-cultural contact in Gujarat in the spheres of trade and politics respectively, the following section will briefly draw attention to the formative influence of previous experiences of extra-European encounter.
Preliminary Encounters
The Whilst ardently scrutinising others, Company agents were not unaware that the reverse was true as well. In determining their actions they habitually considered how these might come across to others, even though the manner in which they envisioned this depended on their own perceptions.
Regarding Economic and anthropological studies assert that familiar identities are commonly treated as a proxy for a trading partner's trustworthiness, which explains the importance of particularistic exchange relations along kinship or ethnic lines. Rituals and insignia that help to determine group identity are consequently seen as crucial signalling devices. 23 What is needed for our purposes is to consider how the problem of distrust was overcome between culturally different trading partners. 
Commercial Interactions
Practically all business in early modern Gujarati port towns was conducted through the intermediation of brokers, as few European observers failed to point out. 32 One of the fullest descriptions of this practice is provided by the sixteenth-century Venetian traveller Cesare Federici, who reported that in Cambay trade was handled by "certain Brokers which are Gentiles and of great authority." 33 Upon a merchant's arrival on shore one of these brokers took charge of all goods and ordered his servants to unload them, pay custom charges, and carry the merchandise into the lodgings reserved for its owner. mahmudis. Following news that a ship which Tapidas owned had been seized by the Portuguese and wrecked near Goa, the broker was imprisoned by Surat's authorities on account of outstanding debts.
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His house and goods were seized upon to pay his creditors, of whom the EIC was just one. explanation suggests that a reputation mechanism based on available information about Tapidas' past conduct had encouraged him to trust the broker, and according to economic theory this experience would rule out future transactions with this individual. 37 However, the conclusion Finch drew from the incident had bearing on the collective, given that he regarded it as a proof of "the villainy of these people and the little confidence that ought to be reposed in them," and resolved that it was to serve as "a warning to me for ever trusting more whilst I them to continue to buy through local middlemen because the latter possessed superior knowledge of the market. 44 One method through which he EIC sought to ensure the loyalty of their brokers was by moving them away from their native environment, which was intended to make them more fully reliant on the Company and less free to pursue their own agenda. 45 Another preferred strategy was to engage in longterm dealings with the same individual or family network, thus increasing predictability and building up understandings based on mutual advantage. If relatively steady commercial relationships with some Indians took shape through these means, this did little to alleviate group prejudice. Thus, in 1617 the English factors in Surat acknowledged that their broker had proven his endeavours on behalf of the EIC, but retained their judgment that "otherwise he differeth not from the rest of his profession, base, disordered and deceitful." 46 In the absence of stable business connections, the decision which broker to confide in ultimately depended on personal judgment. The advice which Richard Cocks gave to a fellow factor in Japan expressed this position clearly. According to Cocks, it was better to entrust Asian intermediaries with goods than to sell no goods at all, provided that they were reputable: "you may trust men which you know are to be trusted. For though I advise you not to trust the Company's goods without ready payment, yet that is to be understood such as are not to be trusted." 47 Unsurprisingly, finding this delicate balance proved too subtle for many Company agents, the majority of whom never quite shook off the fear of being cheated.
Commercial interactions also had a second, official, side to them. In Surat the two principal office-holders exerting control over trade matters were the mutasaddi and the shahbandar (harbour master), who were in charge of civic administration and the customs house, respectively. 48 Goods could not be cleared before their price was fixed, tolls were paid, and a stamp of approval was received.
Moreover, permission was required for ships to load or unload and for persons to come upon shore. 54 He also believed that the VOC faced a more immediate consequence from the rotation of office-holders, which had direct bearing on the problem of trust.
Namely that decrees issued by sitting governors could not be depended upon because they were frequently disregarded by their successors. 55 While soliciting imperial farmans remained a principal strategy aim, Company agents stationed in India increasingly recommended informal strategies which complemented, or provided alternatives to, institutional arrangements. The Dutch authors of the "Cordt relaes" (ca. 1617-1620) remarked that import and export duties were negotiable as long as one cultivated a good relationship with the officers of the custom house. 56 Furthermore, rather than spending lavishly on an official embassy, they recommended acquiring the assistance of a Mughal courtier to act as the VOC's solicitor. To ensure his or her continuous patronage it was essential to sustain personal relations, to which end periodic gifts in cash or kind were advisable. 57 Alternatively, Wouter Heuten and his co-authors suggested the brokerage of individuals such as Abraham de Duits, an Antwerp jeweller employed at Jahangir's court who was said to possess intimate knowledge of local culture and customs.
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EIC and VOC representatives universally agreed that gifts were essential to gain favour with influential persons in the imperial administration and smooth the process of social and political communication. Experience in dealing with Mughal officials taught them which items were in demand and they defined their gift-giving strategies accordingly. Thomas Kerridge asserted that "[t]hings best for presents generally with all the people of these countries are novelties and things of little worth," 59 while
Heuten advised that "presents should not be expensive but artful." 60 Both descriptions implied exotic curiosities that would appeal to the so-called "curious" nature of the inhabitants of Mughal India.
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Again we see that cultural assumptions about Indian people were influential in determining Dutch and English approaches to cross-cultural exchange, as likewise they were in conditioning the manner in which encounters were perceived. Pepwell's complaint that "their turns being once served the remembrance of it is straight forgotten" was only one of many truisms employed to illustrate the alleged fickleness of Indians. 62 It served to support his argument that neither material benefits nor agreements based on mutual understanding sufficed to bind local traders and functionaries to the English, which seriously compromised their reliability as partners. The distrustful attitude which permeates testimonies of commercial interactions also informed approaches to political and diplomatic dealings, and constituted an important factor in justifying the use of naval aggression by the Dutch and English Companies.
Accommodation and Conflict
In 1615 the EIC made their most impressive bid at securing an imperial farman when King James I was persuaded to send a royal ambassador to the Mughal court. 63 As a diplomatic assignment with royal authorisation aimed at establishing official relations, Thomas Roe's embassy was an archetypal institutional undertaking aimed at creating formal arrangements to safeguard the legal status of English trade in Mughal domains. However, reality proved more haphazard and English hopes and expectations were repeatedly thwarted. Exasperated by his failure to obtain the desired document, Roe wrote to the English ambassador in Constantinople that Jahangir was not willing to bind himself upon terms of reciprocity, but only permitted the EIC to stay for the duration of his favour. Consequently, no general license but only restricted permits were forthcoming, "and those revocable at pleasure and subject to daily alterations." 64 After having spent more than two years at Jahangir's court, Roe advised the Company that the idea of procuring permanent capitulations should be discarded: "All the government depends on the present will, where appetite only governs the lords of the kingdome. supported by conjectures about the character of the people at whom they were aimed, emphasising their supposed dishonesty, susceptibility to force, and haughtiness. Thomas Kerridge stated that the arrival of English ships in Surat would serve to "affright this people whom nothing but fear will make honest," and Wouter Heuten suggested that the presence of a Dutch fleet was desirable "to gain some esteem with these arrogant Moors." 67 The idea that remedies for perceived abuses were more readily obtained by arresting native shipping than by seeking formal redress was a strong current in European activity all over India as well as beyond. 68 In 1620, the EIC agents in Surat explicitly used ethnological assumptions to endorse such forceful action: "The inborne cunning of the people of India is incredible. world to see by an act that went against "the nature of our pious Batavians," and feared that as a result "our honest name of word-keeping people will remain obscured." 72 If the VOC wished to continue to trade in Surat, he pleaded in 1624, it would be necessary to deal "more civilly" with the inhabitants.
Counter to a deep-seated discourse, he argued that friendship would accomplish more than force.
Following a practice which the EIC had already begun to implement, Van den Broecke suggested that the ideal way for the Dutch to ingratiate themselves and restore credit was to freight Indian-owned goods on Company ships going to Persia and the Red Sea ports.
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Transporting Indian goods was a means to utilise otherwise unused space, but it also offered a loophole for private traders to transport goods on the account of Asian merchants, especially since influential persons such as Surat's shahbandar and the so-called merchant-prince Virji Vohra were exempted from paying freight costs by the VOC. In defiance of an official prohibition issued by
Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen in 1629, the Dutch factors in Surat continued to transport Indian goods on freight. 74 Their decision was realistic considering the demands of their position, which required them to steer a course between corporate interests and local logics and codes. Since the VOC had to borrow large sums of money from local merchants to finance their trade in Gujarat, the Dutch factors knew they could not afford to alienate them. Representing an often obscure power, Company employees had to make the most of their abilities to build up personal networks and attain social status in Indian commercial and political society. The very nature of a commercial enterprise covering vast geographical expanses tied together by slow communication lines accounted for a certain degree of autonomy for agents on the ground, and an expectation to adapt policy directives to local circumstances was implied in many instructions. 75 What directors were unequivocal about, however, was that the modes that were adopted should be befitting merchants, in other words: cost-efficient. Upon his final departure from Surat he went around town to take his leave from the principal merchants and government officials, while making sure to introduce Van Hasel in a stylised attempt to transmit the goodwill and relationships he had built up in more than a decade unto his successor. 80 While such accommodations did not prevent future breaches of relations, they probably kept them from occurring as frequently as they otherwise might have.
Conclusion
In the opening decades of the seventeenth century and beyond, ethnological assumptions, cultural It is hoped that this contribution has revealed that our comprehension of VOC and EIC involvement in Asian trade is greatly enriched when approaching it not primarily from the perspective of monopolies, profit margins, and protection costs, but through a focus on the experiences and mentalities of the individuals who forged cross-cultural links on the level of face-to-face contact. Further research needs to ask how local perceptions of Europeans mediated commercial intercourse and influenced cross-cultural trust from the South Asian point of view. Initial investigations suggest that, as
